O presente artigo tem como objetivo apresentar a trajetória da valorização da cultura no contexto do crescimento e desenvolvimento sustentável desde o encontro das Nações Unidas no Brasil, que ficou conhecido como ECO-92 e, como a cultura teve sua inserção nos comprometimentos apresentados nas Agendas 21 Global e Local tomando, neste caso, o exemplo da cidade de São Paulo. Hoje, mais do que nunca, os países estão percebendo que o reconhecimento da identidade cultural de sua sociedade é elemento fundamental para (...) qualquer tipo de transformação econômica, social ou ambiental, uma vez que a integração destas esferas só será possível quando se olhar para a necessidade da inclusão e da prática da cidadania, para que então se possa respeitar a diversidade. Este artigo aponta também para a importância da tradição cultural dos povos, sociedades, grupos e comunidades e como estes podem se beneficiar das políticas públicas que poderão ser criadas para garantir a liberdade da sociedade em manifestar e expressar sua cultura em tempos de globalização. (shrink)

Este artículo discute el problema de la permanencia y del cambio. Empieza considerando al esencialismo frente al anti-esencialismo contemporáneo, en un segundo momento, la noción de existencia y, en seguida, las de identidad y cambio. Finalmente, se apela a la naturaleza de la predicación para mostrar que, contra el esencialista, la concepción del cambio de su contrincante sí logra resolver el problema de la unidad semántica de la proposición.

Does Wittgenstein have a coherent philosophy of mathematics? Here, I will be concerned with showing that the answer is positive. However, given that his life-long philosophical perspective on mathematics tends to be misleading, I focus on the specific problem posed by Paul Benacerraf in ‘Mathematical Truth’, that is: the puzzle about how to reconcile the metaphysics with the epistemology for mathematics. My aim is to show that there is an adequate anti-platonistic solution to that puzzle in the mature writings of (...) the Austrian philosopher. (shrink)

En el siglo XX, se ha intentado articular el convencionalismo lingüístico de maneras distintas. Uno de los enfoques más prometedores fue el que propuso David Lewis a finales de los años 60 e inicio de los 70. Lewis subsume las regularidades convencionales que subyacen a la actividad de hablar un lenguaje bajo los estados de equilibrio más generales que resultan de cualquier tipo de comportamiento cooperativo racional. En este artículo propongo que, pese a su atractivo, las convenciones lewisianas deberían ser (...) abandonadas a favor del convencionalismo lingüístico del segundo Wittgenstein. Mi motivación para recomendar tal giro es que la propuesta de Lewis no es capaz de ofrecer una respuesta satisfactoria a la objeción de Donald Davidson, de acuerdo con la cual la teoría convencionalista de Lewis no puede explicar la ocurrencia sistemática de malapropismos en nuestro uso ordinario del lenguaje. En las últimas secciones del artículo, me dedico a mostrar cómo las convenciones wittgensteinianas sí pueden explicar el fenómeno de los malapropismos. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Business ethics research has long been interested in understanding the conditions under which ethical consumption is consistent versus context-dependent. Extant research suggests that many consumers fail to make consistent ethical consumption decisions and tend to engage in ethical decisions associated with ingroup identity cues. To fill this gap, four experiments examine how construal levels moderate the influence of ingroup versus outgroup identity cues in ethical consumption. The studies support the contention that when consumers use concrete construal to process information, they (...) will focus on ingroup cues and make ethical consumption decisions that are aligned with ingroup biases. However, when consumers use abstract construal, they will act more consistently with their inner goals rather than focusing on ingroup and outgroup cues. Social goodwill, which indicates desires to give back to society, is identified as mediating the effects. The findings have important implications for ethical consumption and social influence literature. (shrink)

In chapter 5 of his 1992 book A Study of Concepts, Christopher Peacocke claims that his account of concepts can be reconciled with naturalism. Nonetheless, despite Peacocke’s greatest efforts to convince the skeptics that the mentioned accommodation is viable if one accepts his approach to concepts, some suspicion survives. In a recent paper on this very topic, Jose Luis Bermudez raises questions about Peacocke’s supposed naturalization by arguing that the approach in question is not able to make sense of the (...) distinction between misapplying a concept one nonetheless possesses and not possessing that concept at all. What I am going to do here is, on the one hand, defend Peacocke’s concept naturalization project from Bermudez’s objection and, on the other hand, show that the latter’s suggestion cannot save the surely crucial distinction between making a mistake in using a concept and being incapable of a mistake or a correct use because of not having the concept. (shrink)

Discuto dos aspectos del reciente libro de Atocha Aliseda sobre el razonamiento abductivo. El primero tiene que ver con la clasificación de la abducción propuesta por Aliseda respecto al tipo de lógica que le subyace. El segundo se refiere al mecanismo de búsqueda de hipótesis abductivas que nos ofrece Aliseda.

En este artículo, rechazo algunas sugerencias de Michael Beaney y Michael Dummett sobre como resolver la paradoja del análisis: el aparente conflicto entre una explicación de la corrección y de la informatividad del análisis conceptual. Propongo el enfoque de los conceptos abiertos como la mejor manera de disolver la paradoja.

Aquí lo que me interesa es, primero, distinguir dos problemas de justificación con respecto a la inferencia inductiva: por un lado, el de una justificación persuasiva de este tipo de inferencia y, por otro lado, el de una justificación explicativa de tal inferencia. En segundo lugar, intento mostrar que el argumento de Ramsey-de Finetti a favor de las reglas inductivas de la lógica bayesiana no es capaz de proporcionar una justifi-cación persuasiva de estas reglas. Finalmente, propongo una justificación explicativa para (...) las reglas de condicionalización bayesianas en términos de un argumento trascendental de inspiración kantiana y de estilo davidsoniano.Here, I am interested, firstly, in distinguishing two justification problems concerning inductive inference: on the one hand, the problem of a persuasive justification of induction and, on the other, the problem of an explicative justification of this sort of inference. Secondly, I intend to show that Ramsey-de Finetti’s argument in favor of Bayesian inductive rules cannot provide a persuasive justification for these rules. Finally, I propose an explicative justification for Bayesian conditionalization rules in terms of a transcendental argument of Kantian inspiration and Davidsonian style. (shrink)

The philosophy of mathematics of the later Wittgenstein is normally not taken very seriously. According to a popular objection, it cannot account for mathematical necessity. Other critics have dismissed Wittgenstein's approach on the grounds that his anti-platonism is unable to explain mathematical objectivity. This latter objection would be endorsed by somebody who agreed with Paul Benacerraf that any anti-platonistic view fails to describe mathematical truth. This paper focuses on the problem proposed by Benacerraf of reconciling the semantics with the epistemology (...) for mathematics. It is claimed that there is a way of solving Benacerrafs problem along the lines suggested by Wittgenstein's later remarks on mathematics. This will require demonstrating that a satisfactory conception of mathematical objectivity can be extracted from his mature philosophy. (shrink)

Aristotle’s conception of causality and the ones Modern philosophers have bequeathed us have been exhaustively discussed, although the contrast between them has not, in my opinion, been sufficiently highlighted. This paper proposes to fill this gap. I start with Aristotelian causality and his theses that causal explanation requires knowledge of causal laws and that the necessity associated with these laws presupposes the existence of causal powers. I discuss next Locke’s and Leibniz’s attempts to modernize Aristotle’s theses on causality. The third (...) part of the paper presents two paradoxes Hume identified, on the one hand, between Locke’s and Leibniz’s theses about our knowledge of causal laws and, on the other hand, between the Aristotelian thesis that there must be causal powers and the scientific practice of Modernity. Hume’s proposal to eliminate these paradoxes is also discussed. I finish with some critical remarks on the humean model about our knowledge of causal laws as compared with his contribution to the analysis of the concept of causality. (shrink)

According to Michael Dummett, deductive inference stands in need of justification which must be provided by the theory of meaning for natural language. Such a theory, he insists, should deliver an explanation for the two essential features of deduction: validity and fruitfulness. Dummett claims that only a molecularist theory of meaning could offer the desired justification. In this paper, I will consider and criticize his solution to the problem of the justification of deduction: the so-called molecular verificationist explanation. My aim (...) here will be to show that Dummett's solution does not succeed in reconciling the conflicting demands of the respective explanations of validity and fruitfulness. (shrink)

The appearance of Bayesian inductive logic has prompted a renewed optimism about the possibility of justification of inductive rules The justifying argument for the 'rides of such a logic is the famous Dutch Book Argument (Ramsey-de Finetti’s theorem) The issue winch divides the theoreticians of induction concerns the question of whether this argument can indeed legitimize Bayesian conditionalization rides Here I will be firstly interested in showing that the Ramsey de Finetti's argument cannot establish that the use of the mentioned (...) conditionalization rides is the best option against Dutch Book betting strategies except in special circum stances I suggest secondly that some presuppositions of the Ramsey de Finetti’s theorem (for instance, the principle of maximization of expected utility) themselves demand a justification. (shrink)

Resumen: Este artículo discute la tesis negativa de Hume sobre la religión; en segundo lugar, examina el intento kantiano de refutarlo con un argumento que apela a una supuesta superación del conflicto entre virtud moral y felicidad, y finalmente retoma la tesis humeana con Kierkegaard, para quien el cristianismo auténtico está fundado en la aceptación del absurdo. Esa dialéctica entre los tres pensadores es crucial: primero, la tesis del filósofo escocés de que la religión descansa sobre una paradoja; en seguida, (...) la antítesis kantiana asociada a cierta reinterpretación nouménico-ética del cristianismo, y, por último la restauración kierkegaardiana de la posición de Hume a través de una interpretación existencial del cristianismo.: This paper discusses, first, Hume’s negative thesis about religion; secondly, it deals with Kant’s attempt to refute him with an argument which appeals to a supposed elimination of the conflict between moral virtue and happiness; finally, it revisits Hume’s thesis with Kierkegaard, for whom authentic Christianity is founded on the absurd. This dialectic among the three thinkers is crucial: first, the Scottish philosopher’s thesis that religion rests upon a paradox; then the Kantian antithesis associated with a certain noumenic-ethical reinterpretation of Christianity; and finally Kierkegaard’s restauration of Hume’s position by means of an existential interpretation of Christian faith. (shrink)

En este artículo, discuto la metodología filosófica frente a los límites del sentido y de la racionalidad. Empiezo con la concepción según la cual el filósofo debería resignarse a exhibir el sinsentido de otros filósofos, pero finalmente tendría que callarse, ya que su propio discurso necesariamente sobrepasa los límites de la racionalidad. En seguida, propongo una metodología interpretativa para la filosofía en un intento de caracterizar mejor estos límites y evitar el silencio que inviabilizaría todo el discurso filosófico. Finalmente, busco (...) reconciliar la metodología filosófica interpretativa con la irracionalidad interna del filósofo apelando a una división de su mente entre el sentido común y una segunda agencia que está destinada a sobrepasarlo. Dicha esquizofrenia de la filosofía sería la única manera de entender su tarea recurrente de trazar de manera segura los límites de nuestra comprensión cotidiana del mundo. (shrink)

This paper aims to explore the association between over-indebtedness and two facets of well-being – life satisfaction and emotional well-being. Although prior research has associated over-indebtedness with lower life satisfaction, this study contributes to the extant literature by revealing its effects on emotional well-being, which is a crucial component of well-being that has received less attention. Besides subjective well-being, reported health, and sleep quality were also assessed. The findings suggest that over-indebted consumers have lower life satisfaction and emotional well-being, as (...) well as poorer health and sleep quality. Furthermore, over-indebtedness impacts life satisfaction and emotional well-being through different mechanisms. Consumers decreased perceived control accounts for the impact of over-indebtedness on both facets of well-being. Financial well-being, partly mediates the impact of indebtedness status on overall life satisfaction. The current study contributes to research focusing on the relationship between indebtedness, well-being, health, and sleep quality, and provides relevant theoretical and practical implications. (shrink)

Dos de las respuestas a la pregunta sobre la naturaleza de la comprensión lingüística —el comunitarismo y el interpretativismo—, las cuales discuto ampliamente en Escepticismo del significado y teorías de conceptos, son objeto de la crítica de Axel Barceló en su comentario al libro. En esta réplica respondo a sus objeciones mostrando que la concepción comunitarista de la comprensión de palabras está en condiciones de distinguir entre una comprensión divergente y la no comprensión, y que el enfoque interpretativista no exige (...) el conocimiento previo de las intenciones comunicativas del hablante para dar cuenta de la fijación interpretativa de su comprensión lingüística. Two answers to the question about the nature of linguistic understanding —the community view and the interpretive stance—, which I discuss in my book Escepticismo del significado y teorías de conceptos, are criticized by Axel Barceló in his short commentary. Here, I address his objections by showing that, within the community view, distinguishing between a deviant understanding and no understanding at all is possible, and that the interpretive stance does not require previous knowledge of the speaker's communicative intentions in order to explain how an interpreter could determine the meaning of his words. (shrink)

En este breve comentario, discuto dos aspectos, en mi opinión esenciales, del reciente libro de Atocha Aliseda sobre el razonamiento abductivo (Abductive Reasoning). El primero tiene que ver con la clasificación de la abducción propuesta por Aliseda respecto al tipo de lógica que le subyace. Sobre esto, considero que la mejor opción sería tal vez excluir la abducción de tal clasificación. El segundo se refiere al mecanismo de búsqueda de hipótesis abductivas que nos ofrece Aliseda (el método computacional de los (...) árboles semánti-cos extendidos). Sugiero que queda por establecerse la realidad psicológica de tal mecanismo.I discuss, in this brief commentary, two relevant aspects of Atocha Aliseda’s recent book on abductive reasoning (Abduc-tive Reasoning). The first has to do with Aliseda’s proposed classification of abduction with respect to the sort of logic under-lying it. I contend that perhaps the best option is to exclude abduction from this classification. The second aspect concerns the search mechanism for abductive hypotheses offered by Aliseda (the computational method of extended semantic tableaux). I suggest that its psychological reality has yet to be established. (shrink)

The appearance of Bayesicin inductive logic lias prompted a renewed op tirrusm about the posstbdity of justification of tnductwe rules The justifying argument for the 'rides of such a logic is the famous Dutch Book Argument (Ramsey-de Finettes theorent) The issue winch divides the theoreticians of induction concerns the question of whether this argument can indeed legitimize Bayesian conditmalization rides Here I will be firstly interested in showing that the Ramsey de Finetti's argument cannot establish that the use of the (...) rnentioned conditionalization rides is the best option against Dutch Book betting strategnes except in special circum stances I suggest secondly that some presuppositicms of the Ramsey de Finetti s theorem (for instance, the principie of maximizaticrn of expected utility) themselves demand a justtfication. (shrink)

En este trabajo intento mostrar, en primer lugar, que el realismo interno de Hilary Putnam no logra explicar filosóficamente la fijación de la referencia de las expresiones del lenguaje cotidiano. En segundo lugar, sugiero una explicación alternativa del mecanismo de fijación de la referencia apelando al concepto de interpretación radical; además, el enfoque interpretativo lo concebiré como una variante del realismo que acepta la relatividad conceptual, pero rechaza la relatividad ontológica.This paper intends to show, first, that Hilary Putnam’s internal realism (...) does not provide a satisfactory philosophical explanation of the fixation of reference of natural language’s expressions. Second, I suggest an alternative explanation of the determination of reference in terms of radical interpretation; besides, the interpretative approach is conceived here as a variant of realism which accepts conceptual relativity while rejecting ontological relativity. (shrink)

Con el descubrimiento de la lógica inductiva bayesiana se ha renovado el optimismo acerca de la posibilidad de justificación de la inferencia inductiva. La justificación de las reglas inductivas bayesianas se conoce como el argumento del libro de apuestas holandés (el teorema de Ramsey-de Finetti). ..

Michael Beaney ha sugerido recientemente que la distinción fregeana entre sentido y referencia fue propuesta para resolver la famosa paradoja del análisis. Casi diez años antes, Michael Dummett ya insistia en que Frege fue uno de los prirneros en buscar una soluci6n satisfactoria de esta paradoja. En esre articulo, discuto algunas sugerencias de Beaney y Dummett de cómo resolver la paradoja al estilo fregeano y tarnbién sus propias contribuciones no fregeanas al debate en torno de la corrección y de la (...) informatividad del análisis. Mi intención en esta discusión es mostrar que ninguna de ellas funciona. Concluyo con una propuesta de inspiración witttgensteiniana --el enfoque de los conceptos abiertos- para apoyar la idea de que la apelación a contertidos abiertos es la rnejor rnanera de disolver la paradoja.Michael Beaney has recently suggested that the Fregean distinction between sense and reference was proposed to solve the famous paradox of analysis. Not as recently, Michael Dummett has insisted that Frege was one of the first to look for a satisfactory solution to this paradox. In this paper, I discuss Beanry’s and Dummett’s various suggestions for solving the paradox in a Fregean style as well as their own non Fregean contributions to the debate around analysis’s correction and informativeness. My intention in this discussion is to show that none of them works. I conclude with a proposal inspired by Wittgenstein’s later work -the open concepts’ proposal- designed to support the idea that the appeal to open contents is the best way to dissolve the paradox. (shrink)

Aquí lo que me interesa es, primero, distinguir dos problemas de justificación con respecto a la inferencia inductiva: por un lado, el de una justificación persuasiva de este tipo de inferencia y, por otro lado, el de una justificación explicativa de tal inferencia. En segundo lugar, intento mostrar que el argumento de Ramsey-de Finetti a favor de las reglas inductivas de la lógica bayesiana no es capaz de proporcionar una justifi-cación persuasiva de estas reglas. Finalmente, propongo una justificación explicativa para (...) las reglas de condicionalización bayesianas en términos de un argumento trascendental de inspiración kantiana y de estilo davidsoniano.Here, I am interested, firstly, in distinguishing two justification problems concerning inductive inference: on the one hand, the problem of a persuasive justification of induction and, on the other, the problem of an explicative justification of this sort of inference. Secondly, I intend to show that Ramsey-de Finetti’s argument in favor of Bayesian inductive rules cannot provide a persuasive justification for these rules. Finally, I propose an explicative justification for Bayesian conditionalization rules in terms of a transcendental argument of Kantian inspiration and Davidsonian style. (shrink)

The philosophy of mathematics of the later Wittgenstein is normally not taken very seriously. According to a popular objection, it cannot account for mathematical necessity. Other critics have dismissed Wittgenstein's approach on the grounds that his anti-platonism is unable to explain mathematical objectivity. This latter objection would be endorsed by somebody who agreed with Paul Benacerraf that any anti-platonistic view fails to describe mathematical truth. This paper focuses on the problem proposed by Benacerraf of reconciling the semantics with the epistemology (...) for mathematics. It is claimed that there is a way of solving Benacerrafs problem along the lines suggested by Wittgenstein's later remarks on mathematics. This will require demonstrating that a satisfactory conception of mathematical objectivity can be extracted from his mature philosophy. (shrink)

This article analyses the role of sacred and religious art in Amazonia in the context of the catholic renovation movement of the 19th century, known as Catholic Reform. For that, it takes the order of the main altar of Our Lady of Belém by Pará’s Bishop Antônio de Macedo Costa to Italian architect Luca Carimini as its study object. This piece, along with others made throughout the period of Pio IX’s pontificate, constitutes an iconological programme as well as an artistic (...) and sacred narrative body, which testify to the pedagogical and political debates on the history of Roman Catholicism in Brazil in the 19th century. Besides that, it moves artists that acted under the patronage of Pope Pius IX in Latin American cities such as Santiago, in Chile, and Belém do Pará, in Brazil, putting in evidence the artistic, intellectual and religious connections between the Vatican and South America, as part of an international renewal movement of Catholicism. (shrink)

Although canine identification of body odor (BO) has been widely used as forensic evidence, the concept of nosewitness identification by human observers was only recently put to the test. The results indicated that BOs associated with male characters in authentic crime videos could later be identified in BO lineup tests well above chance. To further evaluate nosewitness memory, we assessed the effects of lineup size (Experiment 1) and retention interval (Experiment 2), using a forced-choice memory test. The results showed that (...) nosewitness identification works for all lineup sizes (3, 5, and 8 BOs), but that larger lineups compromise identification performance in similarity to observations from eye- and earwitness studies. Also in line with previous eye- and earwitness studies, but in disagreement with some studies on odor memory, Experiment 2 showed significant forgetting between shorter retention intervals (15 min) and longer retention intervals (1-week) using lineups of five BOs. Altogether this study shows that identification of BO in a forensic setting is possible and has limits and characteristics in line with witness identification through other sensory modalities. (shrink)

SENA, Luzia (Org.). Ensino religioso e formação docente . (Religious teaching and teacher qualification) Amauri Carlos Ferreira SANGENIS, Luiz Fernando Conde. Gênese do pensamento único em educação: franciscanismo e jesuitismo na história da educação brasileira. (Genesis of an only thought in education: franciscanism and Jesuitism in the history of Brazilian education) Antônio Francisco da Silva TREVISAN, A. Santo Tomás de Aquino – O Credo: tradução, prefácio, introdução e notas. (Saint Thomas of Aquinas – The Creed: translation, preface, introduction and (...) notes) Ivonei Antônio de Oliveira BENELLI, Sílvio José. Pescadores de homens. Estudo psicossocial de um seminário católico. (Fishers of men. A psycho-social study of a Catholic seminary) João Batista Libanio ESTRADA, Juan Antonio. A impossível teodicéia: a crise de fé em Deus e o problema do mal. (The impossible theodicy: the crisis of faith in God and the problem of evil) Lindomar Rocha Mota USARSKI, Frank. Constituintes da Ciência da Religião: cinco ensaios em prol de uma disciplina. (Constituents of the science of religion: five essays on behalf of a discipline) Roberlei Panasiewicz CONGAR, Yves. Ele é o Senhor e dá a vida. (He is the Lord and bestows life) Roberlei Panasiewicz. (shrink)

O Kenkon bensetsu (Tratado e Crítica sobre a Terra e os Céus) é a primeira exposição sistemática sobre os princípios astronómicos e cosmológicos ocidentais que se encontra vertida para japonês. Este texto, composto no Japão por volta de 1650, pelo ex-jesuíta Cristovão Ferreira. consiste na versão japonesa de um Tratado de Esfera ocidental. com abundantes comentários e críticas por um erudito confucionista. No Kenkon bensetsu temos. assim, a circunstância rara de poder analisar, lado a lado, alguns conceitos fundamentais do (...) pensamento ocidental e o modo como foram recebidos pelo pensamento japonês do século XVII. Trata-se portanto de um documento de excepcional valor para se avaliar o intercâmbio cultural e científico entre a Europa e o Extremo Oriente nos séculos XVI-XVII, e é um dos testemunhos mais eloquentes e significativos da influência portuguesa no Japão. /// The Kenhon bensetsu (Treatise and Critic on Earth and Heavens) is the first systematic explanation of the astronomical and cosmological western principles that is translated to japanese. This text was composed in Japan about 1650 by the former Jesuit Cristóvão Ferreira, and is a japanese version of a western Sphere Treatise, including many commentaries and critics by a erudite confucionist. Thus, we have in Kenhon hensetsu the rare possibility to be able to analyse, side by side, both some fundamental concepts of western thought and the way they were received by the XVIIth century japanese thought. This is, therefore, a document of an exceptional relevance in order to evaluate both the scientific and the cultural interchange between Europe and the Far East during the XVIth and the XVIIth centuries. It is also one of the most important and significant testimonies of the portugues influence in Japan. (shrink)

En esta nota critico la teoría de la interpretación de Mota Pinto, arguyendo que predice significados donde intuitivamente no debería haberlos. De paso, critico su presentación de la perspectiva comunitarista del significado, distinguiendo entre dos tipos diferentes de hechos semánticos: el que una palabra signifique lo que significa en vez de significar otra cosa, y el que una expresión signifique lo que significa en vez de no significar nada. In this brief commentary, I argue that Mota Pinto's theory (...) of interpretation predicts meanings where there are none. I also criticize his presentation of the communal perspective on meaning, drawing a distinction between two different kinds of semantic facts: a word meaning what it does rather than meaning something else, and such word meaning what it does rather than not meaning anything at all. (shrink)